An investigation of the probability of reciprocation in a risk-reduction model of sharing.
A laboratory study investigated whether reductions in the probability of reciprocation would influence sharing in situations of shortfall risk. Choice in twelve adults was evaluated against the predictions of a risk-reduction model of sharing derived from a risk-sensitive foraging theory (the energy-budget rule). Participants responded on a computer task to earn hypothetical money which could be later exchanged for real money. If participants selected the sharing option, their earnings were pooled and split with a (fictitious) partner. To model shortfall risk, the task was arranged so that participants lost their accumulated earnings if it fell below an earnings requirement. Across conditions the probability that the partner would contribute to the pool was .95, .65, and 0. Choosing the sharing option was optimal under the .95 and .65, but not 0 condition. Although levels of preference for the sharing option were below optimal, participants chose it significantly more in the .95 and .65 conditions than in the 0 condition. Sharing was lower in the .65 condition than .95 condition but the difference was not statically significant. The results are consistent with prior cooperation research and demonstrate that under shortfall risk, reductions in the probability of reciprocation by partners may decrease sharing.